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Abstract 
Recent estimates suggest that developing countries lose about 1 trillion US dollars each year 
due to illicit financial flows. This paper reviews the empirical methodology that underlies 
those estimates. Various critical aspects of the analytical approach are highlighted, focusing in 
particular on deficiencies in the use of mirror trade statistics to quantify the extent of capital 
outflows due to trade misinvoicing. Serious issues in the empirical analysis include, among 
others, arbitrary assumptions, mixed methodologies and skewed sampling. As a result, it is 
argued that the quantitative results obtained from those exercises have no substantive 
meaning. The trillion-dollar estimate of illicit financial flows from developing countries, 
therefore, lacks evidence and is uncorroborated. 
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1. Introduction 
In December 2014, the Washington, DC-based advisory organization Global Financial 
Integrity (GFI) published a report (Kar and Spanjers, 2014) in which they provide a detailed 
empirical assessment of the possible magnitude of illicit financial flows from developing 
countries. Applying various techniques to analyze official balance of payments and 
international trade data, GFI estimates that illicit flows of money out of developing countries 
amounted to 991.2 billion US dollars in 2012. In addition to this summary estimate, detailed 
results of illicit financial flows by country, by year and by method of measurement are 
provided. 
In this paper, I review the methodology that underlies the GFI’s estimates. In particular, I 
highlight various critical aspects of their analysis, adding to the more general discussion of 
issues in trade misinvoicing in Nitsch (2012). Overall, I conclude that the GFI estimates of 
illicit financial flows from developing countries lack evidence and are uncorroborated. 
 
2. Challenges 
The identification and estimation of illegal activities, such as moving money unrecorded out 
of a country, is a challenging task. Criminals seek to hide activities such that, almost by 
definition, official data does not exist. Still, economic techniques and statistical models may 
be applied to accessible information, including published data, in order to detect and quantify 
the extent of such activities. In this case, however, any estimate should be based on a 
methodology that displays at least the following four features. 
Reasonable. Empirical attempts to analyze illegal activities typically require working 
assumptions. These assumptions, which include definitions, thresholds, and mechanisms, 
should be reasonable. Quantitative results which largely depend on questionable, unrealistic 
assumptions are only of limited value. 
Unbiased. The empirical model that is used to detect illegal activities should yield unbiased 
results. Methodological features and design configurations which systematically affect 
estimation results in a particular direction should be avoided. 
Consistent. The interpretation of the estimated empirical outcomes should be consistent. A 
selective analysis which emphasizes some (preferred) findings, while ignoring others, 
produces questionable and unconvincing conclusions.1 
Robust. The estimation results should be robust. Quantitative findings that turn out to be 
sizably affected by minor adjustments and changes in the empirical methodology or the use of 
new vintages of data are not trustworthy. 
 
  
                                                            
1 Since an inconsistent analysis is likely to produce biased results, the two points seem to be 
related. However, suppose that a methodology yields unbiased empirical results. 
Inconsistencies in the application of this methodology or in the interpretation of the 
quantitative findings may then still invalidate the conclusions. 
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3. Assessment of the GFI Estimate 
Global Financial Integrity apparently aims to meet these conditions in their attempts to 
quantify illicit financial flows from developing countries. As GFI is keen to emphasize, 
clearly-defined empirical methodologies are applied to analyze official, readily-available 
data.2 Also, the policy of GFI to make earlier publications (and, therefore, earlier estimates) 
still available on their website adds to transparency.3 
A proper assessment of the GFI estimate is complicated, however, by the fact that Kar and 
Spanjers (2014) provide only a shallow discussion of their analytical approaches. Since their 
report is the latest release in a series of annual updates of Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008), 
readers are occasionally referred to earlier issues. In addition, methodologies have been 
regularly modified (and sometimes even mixed with previous approaches), making an 
analysis of procedures and results difficult.  
In view of these problems, I begin with a description of the methodologies underlying the 
GFI’s estimates. In particular, I focus on their analysis of mirror trade statistics (labeled by 
GFI as the Gross Excluding Reversals [GER] approach4). I then discuss their procedures in 
more detail and highlight a number of critical issues. 
 
3.1 A Description of GFI’s Methodologies 
In their initial study of illicit financial flows from developing countries, Kar and Cartwright-
Smith (2008) provide an overview of methods for estimating unrecorded capital transfers that 
have been applied in the literature. After a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the various analytical approaches, GFI combines the results from two different methods in 
order to derive their total estimates of illicit flows. While one of these methods is based on an 
analysis of balance of payments statistics or other macroeconomic data, the other approach 
explores international trade statistics. 
GFI’s annual estimates of a country’s total illicit financial flows are computed by summing 
the numerical values obtained from the two conceptually distinct approaches (as long as the 
numbers indicate a capital outflow, otherwise they are set to zero). A discussion of whether 
the two components are indeed disjoint in practice, without any overlap, is not provided. 
Instead, it is argued that various combinations of the models are ‘tested’; see, for example, 
Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008, p. i).5 
Table 1 lists GFI’s benchmark estimates of illicit financial flows from developing countries in 
the most recent year at the time of publication, along with a (partial) decomposition of the 
                                                            
2 By doing so, GFI allows replication of their results. Reproducability is another important 
precondition for credibility.  
3 See http://www.gfintegrity.org/reports/. The website also provides country-level estimates in 
spreadsheet format. 
4 For simplicity and comparability, I often use the GFI’s terminologies and acronyms. 
5 Along similar lines, Kar and Freitas (2012, p. 9) note: “It is somewhat premature to make a 
definitive judgment as to which method provides a more accurate method for estimating illicit 
flows. [...] We invite our readers to provide comments on the two alternative methodologies 
and the reasons why one of them should be preferred over the other.” 
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total estimate by the method of estimation. Two findings are noteworthy. First, there has been 
a change in the methodology for the analysis of macroeconomic data. In 2012, the World 
Bank residual method (CED) has been replaced by the hot money (narrow) approach (HMN), 
which was associated with a further reduction in the overall estimation result. Second, the 
analysis of international trade statistics has gradually increased in importance for the 
aggregate estimate. According to the most recent estimate, illicit financial flows due to trade 
misinvoicing account for about three fourths of the overall figure. In the following, therefore, 
I will focus on the GFI’s analysis of mirror trade statistics.6 
 
Table 1. Illicit Financial Flows by Method of Estimation 
Date of 
publication 
Final 
year of 
results 
Estimate of 
illicit 
financial 
flows 
Methods of 
Estimation 
Estimate of 
Errors in 
Mirror 
Trade 
Statistics 
(GER) 
Share of 
GER in total 
illicit 
financial 
flows 
  mn. US$  mn. US$ % 
December 2008 2006 1,056,000 CED, GER – – 
January 2011 2008 1,440,167 CED, GER  634,900 44.1 
December 2011 2009 902,843 CED, GER 475,690 52.7 
December 2012 2010 858,843 HMN, GER 551,711 64.2 
December 2013 2011 946,677 HMN, GER 763,444 80.6 
December 2014 2012 991,245 HMN, GER 729,881 72.8 
 
Notes: CED refers to the World Bank residual approach which compares a country’s use and source of funds in a 
macroeconomic setting. HMN refers to ‘hot money (narrow)’ which is the net errors and omissions entry in the 
balance of payments statistics. GER refers to ‘gross excluding reversals’ which explores errors in mirror trade 
statistics. 
Source: All estimates are compiled from various GFI publications. 
 
It seems to be conventional wisdom that the misdeclaration of shipments in international trade 
documents (or, in short, trade misinvoicing) is a prominent channel for moving capital 
unrecorded out of a country; Bhagwati (1964) provides an early description of this 
phenomenon. In order to circumvent capital controls, a trader may, for instance, understate the 
value of its exports (export underinvoicing) and have the difference between the actual and 
the stated export values deposited abroad. Alternatively, a trader may overstate the value of its 
imports (import overinvoicing), with similar effects. Each international trade transaction, 
                                                            
6 In addition, it should be noted that GFI’s estimates based on the HMN method are a 
country’s entry on ‘Net Errors and Omissions’ in the International Monetary Fund’s Balance 
of Payments Statistics and, therefore, not the quantitative outcome of an analytical exercise. 
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however, should be recorded twice, in the country of origin (as an export) and in the country 
of destination (as an import). As a result, trade misinvoicing is, in principle, empirically 
identifiable, as long as only one side of the transaction is affected by such behavior. 
Specifically, a comparison of entries of individual trade transactions in mirror trade statistics 
may provide a full quantification of such activities.7 
GFI applies this basic logic on aggregate bilateral trade data between pairs of countries. Using 
annual data obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics, 
they compute, in their baseline approach, the difference between world imports from a 
country and the country’s corresponding exports to the world. Any positive difference that is 
larger than 10 percent of a country’s exports is then interpreted as a quantitative estimate of 
unrecorded capital outflows (due to export underinvoicing). Likewise, any positive difference 
between a country’s imports from the world and the corresponding world exports to this 
country in excess of 10 percent of the export value is interpreted as an estimate of unrecorded 
capital outflows from this country (due to import overinvoicing). A country’s total capital 
outflows due to trade misinvoicing are then computed as the arithmetic sum of the two 
measures. 
For the quantitative results of this exercise, and their interpretation, four assumptions are 
crucial. First, only differences between export and import values that are above a critical 
threshold value of 10 percent of exports are considered as misinvoicing. This correction aims 
to take into account the customary procedure in international trade statistics that different 
valuation methods are used to compile export and import data. While the value of exports 
refers to fob (free on board) values, that is, the transaction value of the goods and the value of 
services performed to deliver goods to the border of the exporting country, import values are 
recorded as cif (cost, insurance, and freight) values, which additionally include the value of 
services performed to deliver the goods from the border of the exporting country to the border 
of the importing country.8 As a consequence, imports (cif) should exceed corresponding 
exports (fob) by definition. More importantly, quantitative results of the estimated extent of 
misinvoicing are directly proportional to the hypothesized ratio between the cif and fob values 
of a transaction. The larger the share of an observed difference between the trade values 
reported in import and export statistics that is explained by transportation costs, the smaller 
the unexplained difference is. Second, reasons other than transportation costs are considered 
to be irrelevant for the explanation of observed discrepancies in international trade statistics. 
Any difference between export and import values that is not attributed to bilateral 
                                                            
7 The key identifying assumption for trade misinvoicing is that faked transactions enter the 
trade statistics of the two countries involved in the transaction differently. The extent to which 
this specific type of misreporting behavior is indeed relevant for the transfer of capital, in 
contrast to other potential vehicles, such as using a faked invoice at both customs borders or 
hiding a transaction completely (i.e., smuggling), seems to be unknown. 
Fisman and Wei (2009) provide an interesting analysis along these lines for a specific product 
group, antique cultural goods, for which there are strong incentives to hide exports (since 
many countries restrict the shipments of such goods, which are often considered to be national 
treasures) while imports are likely to be cleared correctly (because of a risk of confiscation); 
see also Berger and Nitsch (2012) for a more general discussion. 
8 See, for instance, chapter XIV in United Nations (2013). 
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transportation costs is automatically considered as evidence of misinvoicing and, thus, an 
illicit financial flow. Third, only positive differences between (adjusted) import values and 
their corresponding export values are considered as evidence of misinvoicing. By assumption, 
GFI’s Gross Excluding Reversals (GER) approach ignores the possibility of bidirectional 
illicit financial flows and, therefore, does not allow, for instance, for a possible illicit 
repatriation of external funds. Fourth, the analysis of a country’s aggregate trade with the 
world as a group is assumed to yield representative results for the misinvoicing behavior of a 
country’s traders. While the faking of invoices is a transaction-specific phenomenon, it is 
argued that discrepancies in aggregate trade provide a lower-bound estimate of a country’s 
illicit outflows since net outflows to some countries may be compensated by net inflows from 
others. 
Not surprisingly, all these assumptions are, in principle, debatable. Therefore, beginning with 
Kar and LeBlanc (2013), GFI has modified its baseline methodology along two lines. For one 
thing, the comparison of mirror trade statistics between a country and the world as a group has 
been replaced by an analysis of mirror trade statistics between individual pairs of countries. 
This new methodological approach, however, is applied highly selectively. Instead of 
examining trade discrepancies for all trade partners of a country, only trade with a sample of 
33 advanced countries is analyzed, with estimated outflows due to export underinvoicing and 
import overinvoicing then being scaled up by the country’s total exports and imports, 
respectively. More importantly, the methodology applies to only 19 developing countries who 
report trade bilaterally to all advanced countries. For all other countries, the previous 
methodology, based on a country’s aggregate trade, remains in use. 
Another modification takes into account that discrepancies in mirror trade statistics may be 
caused by factors other than transportation costs and misinvoicing. In particular, a correction 
is made for re-exports through Hong Kong which mainly affects estimates of illicit financial 
flows from China.9 China was originally estimated to account for about one half of all illicit 
financial flows from developing countries; after the correction, 250 billion US dollars, or 
about 30 percent of the latest estimate of total illicit financial flows from developing 
countries, had disappeared.10 
Even with these adjustments, however, GFI’s estimates of illicit financial flows (due to trade 
misinvoicing) are crucially dependent on a number of controversial assumptions about errors 
in mirror trade statistics. I now discuss their methodology in more detail, confronting selected 
                                                            
9 Kessler and Borst (2013) provide an extensive discussion of the GFI’s initial, implausibly 
large estimate of trade misinvoicing for China. 
10 According to Kar and Freitas (2012, Table E), China is estimated to have lost annually 
about 274 billion US dollars in illicit financial flows over the period from 2001 to 2010, a 
sum that accounts for about 47 percent of all illicit financial flows from developing countries. 
After the correction for re-exports, the estimates in Kar and LeBlanc (2013, Table 4) indicate 
for China an average annual loss of 108 billion US dollars over the period from 2002 to 2011, 
reducing the share of total illicit financial flows that is attributed to China to about 18 percent. 
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features of their estimation procedure with the challenges which arise when quantifying 
hidden activities.11 
 
3.2 Discussion 
The GFI’s estimates of illicit financial flows due to trade misinvoicing are based on a 
comparison of stated export and import values in mirror trade statistics. While the statistics 
are constructed from official sources, the numerical entries in the matched data differ by 
definition such that the estimation outcomes depend on a proper identification and 
interpretation of errors in trade statistics. 
Gross Excluding Reversals. A key driver of the GFI’s estimate of illicit financial flows is their 
deliberate choice of focusing exclusively on capital outflows while ignoring capital inflows. 
From a (macroeconomic) policy perspective, the relevant figure seems to be how much 
capital leaves a country on a net basis.12 Also, conceptually the assumption that some 
differences in mirror trade statistics indicate trade misinvoicing (that is, as long as they have 
the ‘correct’ sign which is in line with an interpretation as a capital outflow) while other 
differences are irrelevant is troublesome. 
Interestingly, Kar and Spanjers (2014, Table 6) provide a decomposition of their observed 
discrepancies in mirror trade statistics into different practices of trade misinvoicing. 
According to their estimates, illicit capital outflows from developing countries (due to export 
underinvoicing and import overinvoicing) sum to a total of about 5.1 trillion US dollars over 
the period from 2003-2012. The corresponding estimate of capital inflows (due to export 
overinvoicing and import underinvoicing), in contrast, amounts to a total of 12.9 trillion US 
dollars. If one is unwilling to accept the conclusion that developing countries have 
experienced an unrecorded net capital inflow over the past decade, this finding seems to 
suggest that the empirical methodology is largely inappropriate to quantify the extent of illicit 
financial flows. 
Cif-Fob-Ratios. Another simplification is the assumption of a flat 10 percent difference 
between matched import (cif) values and export (fob) values which is considered as freight 
and insurance costs between any pair of countries. This arbitrary assumption has a direct 
impact on the results since any difference in the observed cif-fob-ratio above or below a value 
of 1.1 is interpreted as overinvoicing or underinvoicing, respectively. 
The assumption is arbitrary since, in practice, cif-fob-ratios vary strongly, for various reasons. 
For illustration, Figure 1a provides scatter plots of the import (cif)/export (fob) ratios for the 
trade of countries with the world against a country’s total trade, separately for exports and 
imports, showing large discrepancies across countries. The assumption of flat 10 percent 
                                                            
11 Nitsch (2012) provides a more general assessment of trade misinvoicing and illicit financial 
flows. 
12 Alternatively, from a political economy point of view, a country’s total illicit capital flows 
(that is, the sum of inflows and outflows) may be of interest. In any case, measured illicit 
inflows convey important information. For example, the effects of a change in domestic 
policies that leads to an illicit repatriation of funds from abroad (that is, a return of flight 
capital) remain unobserved when inflows are ignored. 
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correction factor, at best, splits the sample of countries into two halves of equal size.13 Figure 
1b presents the analogues for bilateral trade between pairs of countries as a function of the 
geographic distance between them, gradually expanding the scale of the y-axis for better 
visibility. Again, the assumption of a fixed correction factor that is applied across the board 
seems to be a debatable oversimplification. 
 
Figure 1. Cif-Fob-Ratios, 2012 
 
                                                            
13 The scales of the y-axis differ due to a few outliers. For some countries, such as Aruba 
(ABW) and Panama (PAN), it turns out that the entry in the Direction of Trade Statistics for 
the country’s trade with the world as a whole is much smaller than the corresponding entry for 
the world’s trade with the country. For instance, the world’s imports (cif) from Panama 
exceed Panama’s exports (fob) to the world by factor 8.4, while the world’s exports (fob) to 
Panama exceed Panama’s imports (cif) from the world by factor 5.6 (which implies a cif-fob 
ratio of 0.18). 
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Source: Trade data has been obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics database. 
 
The assumption has a direct impact on the results since any remaining discrepancy in matched 
export and import data, after correcting for the difference between cif and fob values, is 
interpreted as evidence of intentional misinvoicing. While cif-fob-ratios above the threshold 
value of 1.1 are treated as evidence of capital outflows due to trade misinvoicing, occurrences 
of ratios below 1.1 are ignored. As a result, an increase (reduction) in the cif-fob correction 
factor leads to a proportional reduction (increase) in the estimate of illicit financial flows. 
Results reported in Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008, Table 6) show that, in line with intuition, 
the impact of the correction factor on the estimate of illicit financial flows is highly nonlinear. 
Most notably, even a moderate change in the correction factor can have a sizable effect on the 
estimation outcome, as shown in Table 2. For African countries, for instance, an increase in 
the correction factor from 1.05 to 1.10 reduces the estimated amount lost through illicit 
financial flows by more than one half. 
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Table 2. Effect of the Cif-Fob-Correction Factor on Estimates of Trade Misinvoicing 
Region Trade Misinvoicing  
(Yearly Average, 2002-2006) 
 
With a Cif-Fob Correction Factor of 
Change in the Estimate 
of Trade Misinvoicing  
With a Cif-Fob 
Correction Factor of 
 0% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
 bn. US$ bn. US$ bn. US$ % % 
Africa 10.0 9.6 4.2 -4.0 -58.0 
Asia 304.4 299.8 299.2 -1.5 -1.7 
Europe 15.8 8.4 7.6 -46.8 -51.9 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
6.4 5.9 4.7 -7.8 -26.6 
Western 
Hemisphere 
62.4 58.5 55.5 -6.3 -11.1 
All developing 
countries 
399.1 382.2 371.4 -4.2 -6.9 
 
Source: Estimates of trade misinvoicing by cif-fob correction factor are obtained from Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008, Table 6). 
 
Advanced Countries. A consistent application of an empirical methodology gives all countries 
identical treatment. However, when estimating illicit financial flows, GFI frequently deviates 
from such procedure. In particular, GFI differentiates between advanced and developing 
countries. While it seems plausible that, given GFI’s focus on developing countries, 
estimation results of illicit financial flows are only reported for the countries of interest, the 
validity of their methodology and findings could have also been usefully checked for a 
broader sample of countries. 
GFI’s special treatment of advanced countries also applies to their analysis of discrepancies in 
mirror trade statistics on a country-by-country basis. As noted above, only bilateral trade 
discrepancies between a country of interest and the various advanced countries in the sample 
are analyzed, with the observed difference then being proportionately scaled up to the 
country’s total trade. As a result, GFI’s aggregate estimates of illicit financial flows are based 
on the implicit assumption that there is no difference between advanced and developing 
countries as a destination for a country’s trade misinvoicing outflows. To the extent that illicit 
resource transfers from developing countries are predominantly directed towards advanced 
countries, this assumption implies that the estimates are biased upwards.14 
                                                            
14 In its final report, the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (2015, p. 40) 
emphasizes the crucial role of non-African governments in stemming illicit financial flows 
from the continent. They note: “We found that while some developed countries were taking a 
firm stance against some aspects of illicit financial outflows, others had put in place 
10 
 
Double counting. The exclusive focus on country pairs between developing countries and 
advanced economies in the country-by-country comparison is motivated by the difficulty of 
properly attributing observed discrepancies in mirror trade statistics to one of the partners. As 
Kar and LeBlanc (2013, p. 5) note, “the existence of import overinvoicing in one country is 
mathematically equivalent to export underinvoicing in the other (both indicative of an illicit 
outflow)”. Therefore, if no adjustment is made in the aggregation, the same single transaction 
shows up as evidence of trade misinvoicing for both trading partners, implying a double 
counting of illicit outflows. 
The GFI’s approach to limit the country-by-country analysis to trade discrepancies between 
developing and developed countries seems useful because any evidence of export 
underinvoicing and import overinvoicing is, by assumption, interpreted as a capital outflow 
from the developing country (although this assumption rules out the possibility of a return of 
flight capital). However, by scaling up this evidence of misinvoicing with a country’s total 
trade, trade transactions between developing countries are again counted twice. 
Robustness. For a detailed assessment of quantitative results, it is essential that the estimation 
outcomes turn out to be reasonably robust. GFI’s estimates of illicit financial flows, however, 
display considerable variation, both across countries and over time, such that a reliable 
interpretation of the empirical findings seems difficult. 
Figure 2 examines the stability of the GFI’s aggregate annual estimates of illicit financial 
flows from developing countries over time. The plot on the left of Figure 2 presents the GFI’s 
headline figures of total illicit flows, while that on the right plots the corresponding estimates 
of illicit financial flows due to trade mispricing. As shown, there seems to be a clear pattern. 
Typically, illicit financial flows have tended to sizably increase over the sample period; 
according to the GFI’s projections, illicit financial flows are estimated to have risen, on 
average, by about 70 percent over the previous five years. At the same time, however, 
estimates at the beginning of the sample period have been consistently revised downwards. 
For instance, the total estimate of illicit financial flows from developing countries in 2003 has 
been cut by about one half, from 569 billion US dollars in Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) 
to 297 billion US dollars in Kar and Spanjers (2014).15 In sum, the latest estimate of the 
annual amount of unrecorded money shifting out of developing countries has remained 
relatively stable at around 1 trillion US dollars since GFI’s first publication in 2008. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
institutional mechanisms that encouraged such flows and that could qualify them as financial 
secrecy jurisdictions.” 
15 The majority of this decline is explained by the GFI’s shift from the World Bank residual 
method (CED) to the hot money (narrow) approach (HMN). Kar and Freitas (2012, Table 4) 
compare the estimation results for different methods directly; they report that the change in 
methodologies has lowered their estimate of illicit financial flows in 2003 from 617 billion 
US dollars to 359 billion US dollars. Since then, the estimate has been further reduced by 
17 percent. 
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Figure 2. Estimates of Illicit Financial Flows 
 
 
Notes: Longer line patterns mark estimates obtained from more recent publications. See Table 1 for a list of 
publication dates of GFI estimates on illicit financial flows from developing countries. 
Source: All estimates are compiled from various GFI publications. 
 
Table 3 examines the stability in the GFI’s estimates for individual countries. As discussed 
above, GFI has revised the methodology for the estimation of trade mispricing, for a selected 
group of countries, from a country-world comparison to a country-by-country comparison of 
mirror trade statistics. In addition, trade data has been adjusted for re-exports through Hong 
Kong. 
Table 3 confronts the country estimates of illicit financial flows from Kar and Freitas (2012) 
with the corresponding new estimates from Kar and Spanjers (2014). The shift to a new 
methodology has, in most cases, dramatic effects on the quantitative estimates for individual 
countries. At one extreme, illicit outflows from the Russian Federation, which were initially 
estimated to amount to about 7 billion US dollars in 2009, are now estimated to amount to 
123 billion US dollars in 2009, an increase by factor 20. At another extreme, the initial 
estimate of illicit financial outflows from China has been reduced by about 200 billion US 
dollars. Overall, the downward correction of the estimate of trade misinvoicing for China has 
been more than matched by a measurable upward adjustment for a few other countries, most 
notably Russia and India, raising serious questions about the robustness and reliability of the 
country level estimates. 
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Table 3. Estimates of Trade Misinvoicing by Country 
 Country-World 
comparison 
Country-by-Country 
comparison 
Difference 
 2009 Yearly 
average, 
2001-10 
2009 Yearly 
average, 
2003-12 
2009 Yearly 
averages 
 mn. US$ mn. US$ mn. US$ mn. US$ % % 
Armenia, 
Republic of 
1,071 523 832 735 -22.3 40.5 
Aruba 1,829 2,351 8,034 8,237 339.3 250.4 
Belarus . . 7,569 8,404 . . 
Brazil 5,795 2,437 21,977 20,549 279.2 743.2 
Bulgaria 526 477 886 1,498 68.4 214.0 
Chile 939 1,751 3,303 3,957 251.8 126.0 
China, P.R.: 
Mainland 
294,726 264,265 98,528 105,726 -66.6 -60.0 
Cote d’Ivoire 506 579 1,177 2,297 132.6 296.7 
India 0 11,999 28,723 43,495 n.a. 262.5 
Indonesia 8,586 9,425 17,576 16,897 104.7 79.3 
Latvia 0 563 2,093 2,370 n.a. 321.0 
Lithuania 1,239 653 981 2,085 -20.8 219.3 
Malaysia 25,172 22,766 29,245 32,057 16.2 40.8 
Paraguay 1,447 681 2,882 3,586 99.2 426.6 
Philippines 8,292 12,807 5,637 7,783 -32.0 -39.2 
Russian 
Federation* 
6,876 7,835 123,065 90,357 1,689.8 1,053.2 
Thailand 8,406 5,938 14,755 15,966 75.5 168.9 
Togo 200 194 4,250 1,823 2,025.0 839.7 
Zambia 206 486 1,977 2,547 859.7 424.1 
 
Note: * Kar and Spanjers (2014, Table 1) do not indicate the Russian Federation as a developing country that 
reports bilateral trade to all advanced economies. However, they follow Kar and LeBlanc (2013) in reporting 
results based on a country-by-country comparison. 
Source: Estimates of trade misinvoicing based on a country-world comparison are obtained from Kar and Freitas 
(2012, Table 7). Estimates of trade misinvoicing based on a country-by-country comparison are obtained from 
Kar and Spanjers (2014, Table 4). 
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Since GFI applies the modified empirical approach to only a selected group of countries, the 
country estimates of illicit financial flows due to trade misinvoicing are effectively derived 
from different methodologies. GFI justifies this mix of methodologies by arguing that results 
derived from the country-world comparison of mirror trade statistics understate outflows as a 
country’s outflows to one partner would cancel out with inflows from another country. In 
similar fashion, however, a country-by-country comparison may overstate a country’s 
outflows when only (one-sided) errors in mirror trade statistics indicating capital outflows are 
considered. Specifically, since exports for which the final destination is unknown at the time 
of shipment typically cause offsetting errors in trade statistics, a country-by-country 
comparison which ignores one component of the transaction artificially inflates estimates of 
illicit financial flows due to trade misinvoicing.16 
 
4. Moving Forward 
In view of the shortcomings of the GFI’s approach to quantify illicit financial flows from 
developing countries, it seems useful to highlight possible methodological improvements that 
may help to generate more reliable estimates. Obviously, there is no first-best solution, given 
the limitations of available information and data; illicit flows are, by their very nature, 
difficult to identify. Still, a key precondition for the estimation of illicit financial flows due to 
trade misinvoicing and, more generally, a proper interpretation of observed discrepancies in 
international trade statistics is to take a more nuanced approach that goes beyond the routine 
analysis of aggregate trade flows and takes more details of pairwise trade relationships into 
account. In particular, I suggest proceeding along three lines. 
First, there is a strong need for more micro evidence about procedures using misinvoiced 
trade transactions to move capital unrecorded out of a country. For one thing, evidence 
obtained ‘from the field’ may provide insights on the overall relevance of trade misinvoicing. 
Since there is a broad range of methods available to move funds illegally across national 
borders, including the smuggling of cash, any quantitative estimate of a country’s illicit 
financial flows crucially depends on the assumption about the relative importance of trade 
misinvoicing—an aspect about which relatively little is known. In addition, anecdotal 
evidence may provide useful details for an informed assessment of observed discrepancies in 
trade statistics. For instance, it seems reasonable to assume that most of a country’s illicit 
                                                            
16 To illustrate the problem, consider a shipment of a developing country to the European 
Union. Assume that the container is directed to the port of Antwerp in Belgium, but that the 
goods are intended to be sold throughout the European Union, with the final destination being 
only determined when the container is already en route. In the trade statistics of the 
developing country, this transaction will be recorded as an export to Belgium without a 
corresponding entry in the Belgian trade statistics (because the goods are immediatedly 
transshipped), while the European Union countries report an import from the developing 
country without a corresponding entry in the developing country’s trade statistics. In a 
country-world comparison, these (factitious) findings of export overinvoicing (to Belgium) 
and export underinvoicing (to other European Union countries) would cancel out. In a 
country-by-country comparison, observed export underinvoicing may be interpreted as 
evidence of an illicit financial outflow. 
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financial flows are destined to a small number of countries. Consequently, differences in 
matched trade statistics with other countries are unlikely to reflect illicit financial flows. 
Second, it may be useful to restrict the empirical analysis. A limited sample does not only 
allow a more detailed analysis of misinvoicing behavior, instead of automatically attributing 
any discrepancy in bilateral trade statistics to illicit financial flows, it also yields, in most 
cases, empirical results of sufficient accuracy. For instance, for the quantification of illicit 
financial flows at a global scale, it seems suitable to focus on a few large countries that 
account for the overwhelming majority of illicit outflows. At the country level, the analysis 
may be centered on a few selected partner countries that turn out to be the main destinations 
for the country’s illicit flows. Ferrantino, Liu, and Wang (2012) provide an interesting 
example of a detailed assessment of the U.S.-China trade data discrepancy. 
Third, to the extent that institutional knowledge about practices of trade misinvoicing is 
missing, a systematic analysis of observed differences in matched partner trade statistics is 
helpful, especially for trade data at the product level. By identifying any systematic variation 
in discrepancies across products and countries, this analysis allows correcting for alternative 
sources of disparities in pairwise trade statistics; see, for example, Berger and Nitsch (2012) 
for an application. 
 
5. Summary 
A growing literature applies economic theories, statistical methods and forensic techniques in 
order to detect and quantify illegal and otherwise hidden activities. Despite large efforts, the 
analysis is challenging, and the results often strongly depend on heroic assumptions. 
In this paper, I review estimates of the illicit outflow of capital from the developing world. In 
particular, I highlight and discuss various critical aspects of the analytical approach that 
underlies those estimates. 
A fundamental challenge for the GFI’s methodology is their quantitative result that illicit 
financial inflows into developing countries sizably exceed illicit financial outflows out of 
these countries. According to the estimates in Kar and Spanjers (2014), total trade 
misinvoicing inflows are larger than total trade misinvoicing outflows by about factor 2 over 
the period from 2003 through 2012. Conceptually, this result raises the issue why the 
methodology that is proposed and used by GFI to quantify misinvoicing behavior in one 
direction (that is, for capital outflows from developing countries) should be inappropriate or 
flawed for the identification and quantification of misinvoicing activities in the other direction 
(capital inflows). In any case, the detailed numerical results provide a new perspective on the 
GFI’s argumentation against ‘netting out’ capital flows and to focus exclusively on gross 
outflows (labeled as ‘gross excluding reversals’ method). 
Another source of major concern is the large variability of country-level estimates of illicit 
financial flows. For some countries, the estimated loss of resources through illicit financial 
flows changed by hundreds of billions of US dollars after adjustments in the methodology. 
Since the estimation results for individual countries turn out to be highly sensitive to arguable 
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assumptions, also the (much more stable) findings about aggregates and trends seem to be 
invalidated.  
Overall, I conclude that the quantitative results reported by GFI have no substantive meaning. 
Therefore, the claim that in 2012 the illicit flow of money from developing countries totaled 
1 trillion US dollars lacks evidence and is uncorroborated. 
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